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THE POWER OF PREVENTION:  
THE EXTENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITY IN 
THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 Colleen Thrasher & Jeremy Power*  
ABSTRACT 
This article attempts to delineate the scope of a municipality’s legal 
power within the realm of environmental management. Part one of 
this article looks at the legal position of a municipal government in the 
Canadian constitutional framework. The authors note that 
municipalities are creatures of statute and their available powers are 
tightly prescribed by legislation. Part two of this article is a case study 
of the City of Toronto's efforts to manage pollution in the Great Lake 
region, particularly with respect to Lake Ontario. Despite the limits to 
a municipality’s power, the authors argue that many effective pollution 
prevention strategies fall within existing municipal authority. The 
authors conclude that a municipality has the unique and powerful 
ability to adopt effective source-control bylaws being the source of a 
significant amount of pollution. 
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A discussion of a complex issue is best begun by acknowledging simple 
truths. Municipalities are local governments. Their stipulated purpose is often to 
provide good, accountable, and responsible governance on matters in their 
jurisdiction, as delegated by the province.1 Municipalities are not environmental 
organizations with agendas of sustainability; but, given the breadth of 
environmental concerns that exist within a municipality’s confines, from storm-
water overflow to waste collection, a municipality must be positioned to deal with 
certain environmental issues. Howard Epstein suggests, “…it is legally possible 
for the senior levels of government to take full and exclusive responsibility for all 
environmental matters. But if they did so it would bring into question the very 
rationale for local government at all.”2 Indeed, local governments should possess 
some aspect of environmental authority.  
Thus, this paper poses the following questions: what legal space does a 
municipality occupy in the Canadian context? And, given that position, what are 
the barriers to environmental authority exercised by a municipality? Although 
Epstein has characterized these questions as “decades-old,”3 the barriers to 
environmental management are relatively easy to establish when looking at where 
a municipality is situated in the Canadian constitutional framework; a municipality 
is only able to enact by-laws to regulate areas that the provincial government has 
stipulated are under municipal control. Not all environmental issues fall under 
municipal control. The first part of this paper explores that limitation further.  
Given the “…enormous potential to transform how we live our lives 
through exercise of the appropriate powers at the municipal level”,4 the second 
part of this paper presents concrete examples of municipal action in 
environmental issues by way of a case study of Great Lake pollution and an 
examination of the City of Toronto’s successful efforts to manage sewage 
overflow.  The case study suggests that municipalities have a strong preventative 
 
1 For example: Municipal Act, SO 2001, c 25, s 2.  
2 Howard M Epstein, “Subsidiarity at Work — The Legal Context for Sustainability Initiatives at the Local 
Government Level: How an environmental agenda could be advanced by Canadian municipalities” (2009) 63 
MPLR (4th) 56 at 58. 
3 Ibid at 57. 
4 Ibid. 
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edge to address pollution management within their existing delegated authority. 
The locality of the municipality makes a municipality poorly situated to deal with 
the widespread, international ramifications of Great Lake pollution; however, 
because many pollutants originate in the municipality, a municipality can 
effectively harness its control over things like sewer systems and waste discharge 
to prevent pollution at its source. An analysis of the municipality as a pollution 
preventer sheds new light on the power of a municipality and helps to answer the 
decades-old question of the scope of municipal environmental authority.5 
THE LEGAL SPACE OCCUPID BY A MUNICIPALITY 
It is not the intention of this paper to examine the increasing delegation by 
Canadian provinces to municipalities of power to regulate the environment 
broadly, but to suggest that they currently have the capacity to be major 
environmental players within existing grants of authority. A municipality is best 
suited to regulate and make by-laws in the spheres of authority that have been 
delegated to it.6 As Howard Epstein states, “…given the typical array of powers 
now granted by the provinces to their municipalities, what is required is the 
dedication of local government political officials to use those powers in ways that 
are designed to advance a sustainability objective. Little more.”7 After all, 
municipalities have some notable areas of authority and it is within those spaces 
that environmental initiatives have the capacity to thrive.  
In Canada, the division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments is dictated by the Constitution Act.8 Sections 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act list the respective subject matters over which the federal and 
provincial governments have jurisdiction. Yet, jurisdiction over a specific subject 
matter does not always motivate government to actually legislate in that area. 
Constitutional jurisdiction provides the capacity to create policy, but it does not 
 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid at 64. 
7 Ibid.  
8 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  
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necessarily compel a government to take any particular course of action or to take 
any action at all.9 
Municipalities, in turn, are given authority to act by the provincial 
government; they are considered to be creatures of provincial statutes.10 Thus, what a 
municipality can do and what a province can do are intimately related. For 
example, under Canada’s Constitution Act the federal and provincial governments 
both have jurisdiction to pass laws with respect to water management issues.11 
Given that the Constitution Act does not specify which level of government has 
jurisdiction over the environment or water, jurisdiction is shared.  In Ontario, the 
provincial government has taken the lead in regulating water quality and quantity 
management within provincial geographic boundaries. Ontario has enacted 
legislation that authorizes municipalities to administer aspects of water 
management.12  
While a municipality may have authority to regulate some aspects of water 
management, others are beyond its purview. Municipal water management, for 
instance, may not include the management of water bodies themselves. It may 
seem obvious to conclude that the Toronto harbour belongs to the City of 
Toronto because it is in the City of Toronto, but the Toronto harbour is in fact 
governed by PortsToronto, a federal government enterprise.13 The geographic 
location of the specific water body is not necessarily the determining factor in 
setting the jurisdiction. The federal government has jurisdiction related to 
fisheries, navigation, federal lands, and international relations, including 
responsibilities pertaining to managing boundary water shared with the United 
States.14 The federal government also plays a significant role in setting national 
 
9 Kathryn Harrison, Passing the Buck: Federalism and Canadian Environmental Policy (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1996) at 18, cited in Brenda Heelan Powell, Environmental Assessment & the Canadian Constitution: 
Substitution and Equivalency (Edmonton: The Environmental Law Centre (Alberta) Society, 2014) at 10, 
online: <http://elc.ab.ca/media/94543/EAConstitutionBriefFinal.pdf> [B Powell]. 
10 Stanley M Makuch, Neil Craik & Leisk Signe B, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2004) at 75; Epstein, supra note 2 at 58. 
11 Provincial legislative powers include, but are not restricted to, areas of flow regulation, authorization of 
water use development, water supply, pollution control, and thermal and hydroelectric power development. 
Federal legislative powers include, but are not restricted to areas of fisheries, navigation, federal lands, and 
international relations. 
12 See Municipal Act, SO 2001, c 25, s 11(11).  
13 “Governance” (2019), online: PortsToronto: <https://www.portstoronto.com/portstoronto/ 
governance.aspx>. 
14 B Powell, supra note 9.  
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environmental policies and standards. This highlights that the federal government 
has jurisdiction over a number of aspects relating to water governance, despite 
the fact that a particular harbour is ostensibly located within or adjacent to a city. 
It further demonstrates that a municipality’s authority is consequently 
constrained; it cannot overstep the boundaries created by the division of powers 
and the provincial legislation.  
As the above example makes clear, the division of powers does not grant 
one specific level of government exclusive authority to regulate with respect to 
environmental matters. Both provincial and federal levels of government have 
legislative authority regarding environmental concerns because environmental 
concerns are overlapping in nature. Further, municipal governments, which have 
their legislative authority granted to them by provincial governments, also have a 
major part to play. Take for instance the situation in Spray-Tech.15  The case 
involved a municipal by-law passed in 1991 by the Town of Hudson, Quebec, 
which tightly restricted the use of pesticides for non-essential (or cosmetic) uses 
within its boundaries. Chemlawn and Spraytech, both companies that routinely 
apply pesticides, had lost challenges to the by-law in two Quebec courts before 
appealing to the Supreme Court to strike down the by-law. The companies argued 
that municipalities did not have the power to control local pesticide use and that 
the by-laws conflicted with federal and provincial legislation.16 The SCC ruled on 
behalf of the town, and found that the town did have the authority, and that this 
authority did not conflict with federal or provincial legislation.17  
The Supreme Court in Spray-Tech recognized the principle of subsidiarity 
noting that: “…law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a level 
of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected 
and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to 
population diversity.”18 Justice Lebel did qualify this statement however, noting 
that “…no matter how laudable the purpose of the by-law may be, and although 
it may express the will of the members of the community to protect their local 
 
15 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v Hudson (Town), 2001 SCC 40, [2001] 2 SCR 241 [Spraytech 
cited to neutral citation]. 
16 Ibid at para 40.  
17 Ibid at para 55.  
18 Ibid at paras 3, 53–54. 
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environment, the means to do it must be found somewhere in the law.”19 While 
Spray-Tech can be seen as a win for the environmental authority of a municipality, 
it is also a reminder that a municipality’s authority is limited to what is stipulated 
in its governing provincial act. A municipality cannot behave as an agent for 
positive environmental change in any way that it chooses. Similarly, in Enterprises 
Sibeca inc c Frelighsburg, Justice Deschamps said that “…protecting the natural 
environment within a municipality's jurisdiction cannot be regarded as an 
improper goal for a municipal council.”20 As Epstein notes, however, the key part 
of Justice Deschamps’ statement is “within a municipality’s jurisdiction.”21    
Consequently, most cases since Spray-Tech have turned on the statutory 
powers of municipalities to regulate local activities. In Darvonda Nurseries Ltd v 
Greater Vancouver (Regional District),22 for example, the Region's District Director 
successfully set more rigorous air quality standards for agricultural operations 
than the province-wide standard set in the provincial Agricultural Waste Control 
Regulation. The District adopted an air quality by-law pursuant to the Environmental 
Management Act, which allowed it to issue air contaminant discharge permits 
“…subject to requirements for the protection of the Environment.”23 Darvonda 
Nurseries argued that it was exempt from the by-law standards because it 
complied with provincial standards.24 The court concluded that the Environmental 
Management Act was intended to give the District authority to regulate the 
discharge of air emissions within its boundaries differently than in the rest of the 
province. Nothing in the Regulation specifically restricted the authority of the 
District to impose more stringent air emission limits, and it was possible for 
Darvonda to comply with both municipal and provincial standards.25 In contrast, 
some federal or provincial statutes or regulations specifically bar municipalities 
from acting. In those cases, municipalities cannot rely on Spray-Tech to expand 
their powers. 
 
19 Ibid at para 48.  
20 Enterprises Sibeca inc c Frelighsburg (Muncipalité), 2004 SCC 61, 2004 CSC 61.  
21 Epstein, supra note 2 at 66. 
22 Darvonda Nurseries Ltd v Greater Vancouver (Regional District), 2008 BCSC 1251, 51 MPLR (4th) 56 
[Darvonda]. 
23 Ibid at para 2.  
24 Ibid at para 4.  
25 Ibid at para 114.  
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Spray-Tech has opened the door for municipal by-laws to control local 
environmental harm, but not very far. If there is no statute either permitting or 
forbidding municipal action, municipalities may be able to act, but only if they do 
not “displace or frustrate”26 federal and provincial regulatory schemes. It would 
appear that municipal by-laws must be measured, tied directly to particular local 
harms, and minimize interference with the senior government regulatory 
framework. That municipalities are so constrained may be a disappointing 
conclusion, especially because, in her judgment in Spray-Tech, Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé’s emphasised Justice La Forest’s statement from Canada c Hydro-Québec that 
“…the protection of the environment is a major challenge of our time. It is an 
international problem, one that requires governments at all levels.”27 Municipalities 
are consequently important to environmental initiatives, but the extent of a 
municipality’s importance is unclear. 
There is widespread acknowledgement in both the case law and the literature 
that municipal authority is limited to those specific areas that the provinces have 
extended to municipalities. The division of powers may constrain local 
governments that seek to make sustainably-minded decisions based on local 
environmental concerns. Despite being constrained, the environmental authority 
of a municipality may not be so meagre because municipal participation in 
environmental issues has been heralded as essential and courts are generally 
supportive of environmentalist by-laws falling within municipal jurisdiction. 
Rather, municipal environmental authority may be particularly powerful in some 
discrete legal spaces.  
CASE STUDY 
The Municipality of Toronto 
The City of Toronto Act (“CTA”)28 gives authority to the Toronto municipality 
and some of those spheres of authority are clearly environmental. Examples of 
 
26 Spray-Tech, supra note 13 at para 35.  
27 Ibid at para 3; Epstein, supra note 2 at 59. 
28 City of Toronto Act, SO 2006, c 11, Sch A [CTA].  
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environmental provisions include sections 104(1) and (2) of the CTA which 
indicate that the City of Toronto can pass by-laws “…prohibiting or regulating 
the destruction or injuring of trees in woodlands.” Section 105.3(1) additionally 
gives the City of Toronto the authority to “provide for or participate in long-term 
energy planning,” which is further defined in subsection 2 as including 
considerations for “energy conservation, climate change, and green energy.” 
Water management and waste management are also mentioned at various points 
throughout the CTA.29  
Additionally, there are provisions which do not explicitly reference 
environmental initiatives, but their breadth provides for governance in some areas 
with environmental implications. For instance, municipalities have a long history 
of service provision related to sewage disposal which continues into present day.30 
The authority for by-laws related to sewage provision and maintenance comes 
from sections 8(1), (2), and (3) of the CTA which indicate general areas of 
authority for the City of Toronto.31 Section 8(1) specifies that “…[t]he City may 
provide any service or thing that the City considers necessary or desirable for the 
public.”32 Sewers fall under the scope of that section as well as the breadth of 
other sections like “economic, social and environmental well-being of the City” 
or the “health, safety and well-being of persons.”33 While other municipal acts 
may expressly state that ‘sewage’ is an area for municipal governance,34 it is widely 
known in Canadian law that sewage is considered to be a “core responsibility” for 
local governments.35 
The above non-exhaustive list is demonstrative of provisions which extend 
authority to the City of Toronto to regulate environmental issues. Some of the 
above provisions even specify that the City of Toronto has the discretion to direct 
their authority at ‘green’ or at sustainably-minded initiatives.36 Yet, the presence 
 
29 See Ibid s 19, s 62(1), s 75 for example.   
30 See Philip Anisman, “Water Pollution Control in Ontario” (1971) 5 Ottawa L Rev 342. 
31 See City of Toronto, by-law No 100-2016, To Amend the City of Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 681, Sewers and 
Chapter 851, Water Supply (4 February 2016) for an example in the preamble where the authority was derived. 
32 CTA, supra note 28, s 8(1). 
33 Ibid, s 8(2).  
34 See Municipal Act, SO 2001, c 25, s 11(11); This Ontario Municipal Act does not apply to the City of 
Toronto as indicated by section 7.1(1). 
35 Epstein, supra note 2 at 73. 
36 CTA, supra note 28, preamble, s 108.  
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of those provisions does not mean that the City of Toronto is an agent for 
positive environmental change; a few provisions do not transform what is, in fact, 
a municipal government into a quasi-environmental organization, and nor should 
they. What the provisions do reveal is that the capacity and discretion to make 
sustainably-minded decisions are afforded to a municipality in some discrete legal 
spaces. It is therefore worth examining how environmental authority is capitalized 
upon. The City of Toronto’s efforts to prevent pollution in the Great Lakes 
provide an interesting case study on this point. The City of Toronto’s decisions 
in that context are notable because they are sustainably-minded and capitalize on 
municipal responsibility in the areas of sewage, waste- and storm-water 
management.  
The case-study will be organized as follows: first, the problem of Great Lake 
pollution will be described in order to situate the interests of the City of Toronto; 
second, this study will explore the evidence indicating that the Toronto region 
has been making successful strides in its clean-up efforts; finally, and most 
importantly, efforts undertaken by the City of Toronto will be explored in order 
to assess the preventative mechanisms through which municipal authority can be 
harnessed effectively to achieve positive environmental outcomes.   
Pollution in the Great Lakes and A Brief History of Municipal 
Involvement 
The Great Lakes are freshwater lakes that span the middle-eastern region of 
the US-Canada border. The five Great Lakes are Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, 
Lake Ontario, Lake Huron, and Lake Eerie. The Great Lakes are one of the 
largest sources of surface fresh water in the world, at 18%-20%, and they supply 
84% of North America’s fresh surface water.37  The Great Lakes can thus be 
described as a significant ecological resource with huge impacts on the health and 
well-being of North Americans. Toronto sits on Lake Ontario’s Northwestern 
Shore. It is one of the most populous cities in North America and it consequently 
 
37 Government of Canada, “Working together to protect the Great Lakes,” (3  May 2017) (website) online: 
<https://www.ec.gc.ca/grandslacs-greatlakes/default.asp?lang=En&n=0E691E57-1>; Michael Gilbertson 
& Andrew E Watterson, “Diversionary Reframing of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement” (2007) 
28:2 J Public Health Policy 201 at 201. 
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poses a burden for the shoreline and the lake because of the City’s resource-
demand and the contaminant potential arising from the massive sewage system 
and the industrial sector.  
The problem of Great Lake pollution is intimately connected with storm 
water and sewage management at the municipal level. Municipal wastewater 
effluent is one of the largest sources of pollution, by volume, discharged into 
water bodies in Canada.38 During “…periods of heavy rainfall or snowmelt,” the 
extra water causes the water volume in sewer systems to increase, which leads to 
overflow and “…the release of untreated wastewater directly into the Great 
Lakes.”39 This sewage contains pathogens and pollutants from human and 
industrial waste which are harmful to human health as well as plant and animal 
life. Storm water run-off along streets also picks up contaminants which end up 
being discharged in waterbodies.40 
These pollutants and pathogens contribute to both environmental and 
financial strain due to the clean-up efforts they require.41 For instance, the 
problem of municipal sewage has resulted in multi-billion dollar investments over 
the past few decades, including over $653 million committed by Ontario since 
2007 to municipal wastewater infrastructure upgrades in the Great Lakes Basin.42  
Municipal sewage is also an obvious environmental hazard. Typical 
municipal sewage is a foul cocktail of biological and chemical pollutants, including 
human waste, micro-organisms, disease-causing pathogens such as viruses and 
bacteria, and hundreds of toxic chemicals and heavy metals.43 Pollutants found in 
sewage include oxygen depleting substances (referred to as Biological Oxygen 
Demand or BOD), and suspended solids and nutrients, such as phosphorus and 
nitrogen-based compounds each of which carries a heavy ecological toll when 
 
38 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Wastewater Effluent Development Committee (December 
2006), online at: <http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/mwwe_general_backgrounder_e.pdf>. 
39 Ibid.  
40 The City of Toronto, “Wet Weather Action Plan,” (Toronto: August 2003) at 2. 
41 Government of Canada, supra note 29.  
42 Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Redefining Conservation: Annual Report 2009/2010 (Toronto, ON: 
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, 2009) at 80. 
43 See generally: K Andersson et al, Sanitation, Wastewater Management and Sustainability: from Waste Disposal to 
Resource Recovery, (Nairobi and Stockholm: United Nations Environment Programme and Stockholm 
Environment Institute, 2016). 
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released into a fragile ecosystem, such as by rain or snow melt.44 Toxic metals and 
synthetic organic chemicals — such as cadmium, lead, mercury, silver, zinc and 
PCBs — are commonly found in sewage and pose serious dangers to human 
health and the environment.45 This sewage pollution affects biodiversity, water 
treatment costs, and the ability to enjoy beaches as a result of closures from high 
levels of contamination. In addition, pharmaceuticals, personal care products, and 
household cleaning chemicals are entering water resources through wastewater 
and are a growing cause for concern.46 
Unsurprisingly, the problem of water pollution due to sewage discharge in 
Great Lakes is not new. As early as 1910, conferences in Canada were called by 
the Canadian Commission of Conservation to discuss the human mortality rates 
stemming from pollutants and contaminants found in water, particularly in the 
Great Lake basin.47 It was well-known that lakes near human settlements, 
including cities along the Great Lakes, were “fouled” by sewage in the early part 
of the 20th century.48 In 1918, there was a successful nuisance action launched 
against the City of Toronto because the odours of the sewage disposal plant were 
“…so offensive as to injure the properties of the plaintiffs…to interfere with the 
reasonable enjoyment of the properties of the plaintiffs, and to be injurious to 
the health of themselves and their families.”49 There was a break in the outfall 
pipe of a sewage disposal plant, the pipe which carried the sewage into Lake 
Ontario, and instead sewage was piling up in Ashbridge’s Bay at “…a rate of 
probably half a million gallons each 24 hours,” which lead to the release of 
noxious odour.50 Although the City tried to rely upon its municipal authority to 
construct sewage plants as provided in section 398 of the Municipal Act 51 it was 
 
44 Environment Canada, “Municipal Wastewater Effluent Characterization and Loadings” (Last modified 
July 31, 2013), online: <http://www.ec.gc.ca/eu-ww/default.asp?lang=En&n=4F4513C8-1>. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Environment Canada, Pharmaceuticals in the Environment – An Emerging Threat? (2005), online: 
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/eccc/En13-3-7-2005-eng.pdf>.  
47 Jennifer Read, Yves Gingras & Stephen Bocking, “‘A sort of destiny’: The Multi-Jurisdictional Response to 
Sewage Pollution in the Great Lakes, 1900-1930” (1998) 22 Scientia Canadensis 103 at 104–105, 108. 
48 Ibid at 104. 
49 Fieldhouse v City of Toronto, 44 DLR 392 at 392 (Ont Sup Ct) [Fieldhouse].  
50 Ibid at 395.  
51 RSO 1914, ch 192. 
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found that the City did not have a by-law authorizing the construction of the 
plant nor necessary approval from the Board of Health.52  
Beyond nuisance, there were other significant criticisms of the municipal 
effort at that time; doctors, in particular, concerned by the health crisis stemming 
from polluted water, wanted more provincial oversight of municipal water and 
sewage treatment.53 In response, municipal officials argued that sewage treatment 
was a financial strain for the municipality budget and perhaps too costly to 
undertake.54 While the provincial initiative to chlorinate drinking water effectively 
decreased disease epidemics and outbreaks in the 1920s,55 the woes of the 
municipality budget, particularly given the Depression in the 1930s, stalled further 
development of sewage systems.56 Additionally, by the 1930s, industrialization 
had hit and industrial waste was joining human waste in  Toronto’s sewers. The 
scale of this problem was outpacing the available funding; this eventually led to a 
change in Ontario’s Municipal Code at that time to “…allow municipalities to 
charge users directly for the use of water and sewage services.”57  
Despite these advances, the problem of Great Lake pollution stemming 
from wastewater and sewage overflow continues to plague modern Canadian and 
American cities. The “Great Lakes Sewage Report Card” concluded that 
municipal efforts were inadequate because wastewater “continues to be a major 
source of pollution.”58 This conclusion was reached after the Toronto-based 
Sierra Legal Defence Fund found that “20 cities on both sides of the 
border...together dump more than 24 billion gallons of untreated sewage into the 
lakes each year.”59  
Sewage continues to be a major issue for the Great Lakes despite the fact 
significant progress has been made since the 1920s. Perhaps the most important 
 
52 Public Health Act, RSO 1914, ch 218, s 94(1); Fieldhouse, supra note 47, at 405. 
53 Read, Gingras & Bocking, supra note 47 at 108. 
54 Ibid at 109. 
55 Ibid at 123. 
56 Environment Canada, Environment Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, & Metropolitan Toronto, 
Clean Waters, Clear Choices: Recommendations for Action (Ontario: Metro Toronto and Region Remedial Action 
Plan, 1994) at 72. 
57 Ibid. 
58 William J Angelo, “Report Says Tame CSOs To Keep Great Lakes Clean” (2006) 257:24 Engineering 
News Reports 18. 
59 Ibid at 1. 
Vol. 28 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 151 
 
event in Great Lake water management history was the signing of the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement (“1972 Agreement”) in 1972 by the US and Canada. It 
focused heavily on the problem of eutrophication, an algae-related issue that 
stems from nutrient loading caused by waste water and sewage discharge into 
waterbodies.60 In 1978, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement was amended 
and Areas of Concern for pollution were identified – the Toronto region being 
one of those areas.61 In 2012, Canada and the US signed a new Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement (the “Agreement”), which reaffirmed their goals, updated 
issues pertaining to water quality, and superseded the original 1972 Agreement.62 
Water quality issues addressed by the Agreement include the minimization of 
hypoxic or “dead” zones in the Great Lakes, the maintenance of algae levels, and 
the conservation of Great Lake species habitats.63   
The Agreement also addresses the role of municipalities.  The preamble 
states that the involvement of municipalities is essential to achieve the 
“…objectives of [the] Agreement.”64 Article 1, subsection 1(b) and section 2 both 
repeat that municipal efforts are required for the implementation of water quality 
measures. The importance of municipal involvement is obvious given that Article 
4, paragraph 2(a)(i) specifies that municipal sources of pollution, such as urban 
drainage, must be targeted by the pollution abatement plans developed pursuant 
to the Agreement. Municipal governments must sit on a Great Lakes Executive 
Committee, alongside First Nations and provincial government representatives 
among others.65 
Consistent with the 1972 Agreement, the City of Toronto has been listed as 
an Area of Concern. Characterization as an Area of Concern stems from an 
evaluation of what the Agreement designates as “Beneficial Use Impairments,” 
(“BUIs”).66 There are fourteen BUIs which include beach closings, degradation 
 
60 Gilbertson & Watterson, supra note 37 at 202. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, United States and Canada, 7 September 2012, CAN TS 2013/8 at 
article 13 (entered into force 12 February 2013). 
63 Ibid at Annex 4, part B. 
64 Ibid at 3.  
65 Ibid at article 5, s 2(a): “the Parties shall co-chair the Great Lakes Executive Committee and invite 
representatives from Federal Governments, State and Provincial Governments, Tribal Governments, First 
Nations, Métis, Municipal Governments, watershed management agencies, and other local public agencies.”  
66 Ibid, Annex 1, part B. 
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of phytoplankton, and loss of fish and wildlife habitat.67 The Agreement provides 
that both state and provincial governments must develop Regional Action Plans 
(“RAPs”) to identify the BUIs of a particular region, develop relevant remedial 
measures, and designate entities responsible for remedial measures.68 Of the 
fourteen beneficial uses, the RAP for Toronto has identified five currently 
considered to be impaired in the Toronto region. Specifically, the Toronto region 
of Lake Ontario suffers from eutrophication and algae, beach closings, loss of 
fish and wildlife habitat, degradation of fish and wildlife populations, and 
degradation of aesthetics.69   
The Toronto and Region RAP is managed jointly by Environment & 
Climate Change Canada, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate 
Change, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry, the City of 
Toronto, and the Toronto Region Conservation Authority. The first RAP for the 
Toronto Area of Concern was published in 1989. The first report defined the 
problem and environmental conditions of the Toronto region.70 The second 
report addressed recommendations for actions to improve the impaired beneficial 
uses. It was published in 1994, by which point there were eight BUIs.71 The 
second report identified that of the three main pathways that pollutants take to 
the Great Lakes, storm water overflow and runoff were the most significant, most 
problematic, and most in need of remedial attention.72  
Storm-water overflow and runoff are problems which require action at the 
municipal level. In 1994, the RAP report indicated that methods for reducing the 
quantity of storm runoff must include standards for commercial buildings when 
dealing with storm water, the identification of illegal cross-connections in the 
sewer system, the improvement of storm-sewer systems, and land-use planning.73 
Many, if not most, of the identified methods for reducing storm water runoff are 
 
67 Ibid, annex 2, part B.  
68 Ibid.  
69 See Joanna Kidd, Within Reach: 2015 Toronto and Region Remedial Action Plan Progress Report (Toronto: 
Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, 2016), online: 
<https://torontorap.ca/app/uploads/2017/08/2015-RAP-Progress-Report-final.pdf> [Kidd]. 
70 Environment Canada, Environment Ontario, Ministry of Natural Resources, & Metropolitan Toronto, 
Stage 1: Environmental Conditions and Problem Definition (Ontario: Metro Toronto Remedial Action plan, 1989). 
71 Ibid at 83-82. 
72 Environment Canada, supra note 56 at 14. 
73 Ibid at 17. 
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under the jurisdiction of the City of Toronto. For reference, Chapter 681 of the 
Toronto Municipal Code (the “Code”) is titled ‘Sewers’ and includes by-laws 
which dictate storm-sewer requirements74 and specifications of an illegal sewer 
connection, as well as the enforcement mechanisms.75 
It is notable that the implementation of an international bilateral agreement 
requires so much action by municipalities. Municipalities are essential participants 
in Great Lake management. While the responsibility for curbing Great Lake 
pollution from sewage overflow falls to municipalities, ramifications of pollution 
affect wildlife, habitats, and geology under the jurisdiction of other levels of 
government. The second RAP breaks down the division of powers relevant to 
Great Lake water quality management in the Toronto region. While the efforts 
of municipalities are relevant to storm water runoff and overflow, improvements 
of the aquatic and wildlife community are delegated to NGOs and the Ministry 
of Natural Resources, for example.76  While there are many players involved in 
Great Lake water quality management, it also clear that pollution prevention 
largely falls to municipalities to deal with by way of storm water and sewage 
management.  
The following section will detail the success of the City of Toronto in its 
implementation of the RAP. To conclude this portion of the case-study, however, 
two things should be made clear. The first is that municipalities are essential 
participants in environmental projects that extend far beyond their boundaries. 
As stated in the 2012 Agreement, municipalities have a necessary role to play in 
water management, in conjunction with other levels of government. This is 
significant because it highlights that municipalities are not well-suited to tackle 
this environmental issue in its entirety. Environmental pollution and issues of 
ecological integrity are often cross-jurisdictional and multi-faceted, so while a 
municipality cannot adequately address all aspects of the issue, municipal 
participation is undoubtedly essential to the success of a broader project.  
 
74 The Toronto Municipal Code is a compilation of by-laws organized by subject. Each chapter is a by-law.  
City of Toronto, chapter 681, Sewers at § 681-4.  
75 Ibid, § 681-14.2, § 681-11. 
76 Environment Canada, supra note 56 at 33. 
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Second, municipal participation may be particularly relevant at the level of 
prevention. For instance, municipalities are well-positioned to adopt preventative 
policies because it is within the confines of a municipality that sewage overflow 
occurs. By briefly examining the history of municipal involvement in Great Lake 
pollution and management, it can be concluded that municipalities have the 
capacity to act as agents of positive environmental change by way of participation 
in broader environmental initiatives and the adoption of pollution prevention 
techniques at the source. 
Clean Up in the Toronto Region 
The participatory and preventative nature of a municipality’s efforts make it 
difficult to measure to what extent municipal involvement has resulted in the 
betterment of the Great Lakes region. Despite this problem of measurement and 
attribution, it is clear that the Toronto region of Lake Ontario has improved as 
judged by the BUIs. When the RAPs began, the Toronto region was indicated to 
have eight impairments; last measured in 2018, there are five or six with between 
one-two beneficial uses requiring further assessment.77 The degradation of the 
benthos, restrictions on fish consumption, and restrictions on dredging activities 
have all improved to the point of no longer being listed as impaired uses. 
Compared to other Areas of Concern identified on Lake Ontario, Toronto is 
perhaps the most successful. The Toronto region has decreased its beneficial use 
impairments by 25-37.5%, and a comparably successful Area of Concern is the 
Hamilton Harbour which has decreased its impairments by about 28%.78 The 
other Areas of Concern on Lake Ontario have either maintained the same 
number of impairments or increased.79 
While none of the above statistics can be attributed to municipal action 
alone, it should be noted that the City of Toronto’s efforts have been specifically 
applauded. For instance, the most recent RAP progress report in 2015 indicated 
 
77 Toronto and Region, supra note 69 and Government of Canada, “Restoring the Great Lakes Areas of 
Concern” (27 October 2017) (website) online: < https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-
change/services/environmental-indicators/restoring-great-lakes-areas-concern.html> provide different 
values, this paper lists “5-6” to highlight the discrepancy between the values.  
78 Ibid.  
79 Ibid.  
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that the City of Toronto’s Sewers By-law, adopted by the City Council in 2000, 
has had a noticeable impact on the heavy-metal concentration in the “influent at 
wastewater treatment plants.”80 The Government of Canada has noted that the 
City of Toronto invested considerable sums of money into storm water 
management techniques, and has made “significant progress” on the priorities 
listed in the RAPs.81 Both the Sewers By-law, and the storm water management 
practices could largely be characterized as preventative mechanisms, as will be 
discussed further below – aimed to prevent both the influx of industrial and 
human waste into Lake Ontario.  
Municipal Law and Pollution Prevention in the City of Toronto 
The following section of this paper analyses four of the most notable 
initiatives that the City of Toronto has undertaken to address pollution in the 
Great Lakes; this section will identify the source of those initiatives in law and the 
legal implications of them, and it will also characterize the form of pollution 
control i.e. whether it looks like a preventative technique, abatement, or 
mitigation. This analysis will yield a strong picture of the City of Toronto as a 
pollution preventer thanks to its application of largely prevention-oriented by-
laws.  
Green Roofs 
Section 108(1) of the CTA authorises the City of Toronto to pass by-laws 
requiring the construction of green roofs. A green roof is one “… that supports 
the growth of vegetation over a substantial portion of its area for the purpose of 
water conservation or energy conservation.”82 Pursuant to this authority, on May 
27, 2009, Toronto City Council adopted By-Law no. 583-2009, and the Code was 
amended to include Chapter 492. Article II imposes the following obligation:  
Every building or building addition constructed after January 30, 
2010 with a Gross Floor Area of 2,000 square metres or greater 
 
80 Kidd, supra note 69 at 43. 
81 Government of Canada, “Toronto and region: Area of Concern” (20 February 2017), online: 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/great-lakes-protection/areas-
concern/toronto-region.html>. 
82 CTA, supra note 28, s 108(3). 
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shall include a Green Roof with a coverage of Available Roof 
Space in accordance with the following chart…and no person 
shall construct a Green Roof or cause a Green Roof to be 
constructed unless a permit therefor has been issued by the 
Chief Building Official.83 
At the lower end of the chart is a building with a Gross Floor Area of 2000-
4999 square metres which is required to cover 20% of the Available Roof Space 
with green roof.84 For reference, a 2000 square metre area could probably fit about 
200 cars.85 At the upper end of the chart is a building with Gross Floor Area of 
20 000 square metres or greater which is required to cover 60% of the Available 
Roof Space with a green roof. These provisions, however, do not apply to 
industrial which are subject to a lesser requirement by the Green Roof By-Law. 
Article II, section 492-2 Part C specifies that industrial buildings constructed after 
January 30th, 2011 with 2000 square metres or more of Gross Floor Area should 
have either a 2000 square metre green roof or alternatively 10% of the Available 
Roof Space should be a green roof if that is smaller.  
The penalty for failing to abide by these requirements is a fine not exceeding 
$100 000,86  but there is also a cash-in-lieu of green roof scheme should an 
Applicant not wish or be unable to adhere to the by-law.87 The cash-in-lieu of 
green roof scheme states that when variances of exemptions are granted to the 
green roof requirements, the Applicant has to make a payment reflective of the 
cost of construction of a green roof equal to $200/m2 of the reduced or exempted 
area. The funds collected from the cash-in-lieu scheme are directed towards an 
Eco-Roof Incentive Program.88  
The Eco-Roof Incentive Program is a financial incentive program which 
encourages the adoption of green roofs in all buildings, but notably buildings 
constructed prior to the enactment of the by-law since the by-law requires the 
adoption of a green roof in new constructions.89 The incentive program offers 
 
83 City of Toronto, By-law No 583-2009, Green Roofs (27 May 2009). 
84 Ibid, § 492-1: Available Roof Space means “the total roof area of the building or building addition” 
excluding some species areas like private terraces or spaces designated for renewable technology. 
85 Büro Berlin, “Size Ratios” (2016) online: <https://www.2000m2.eu/ratios/>. 
86 City of Toronto, supra note 83, § 492-21.  
87 Ibid, § 492-12.  
88 Ibid, § 492-12(C). 
89 Ibid, § 492-2 “Green Roofs Required.” 
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“…commercial, industrial, and institutional buildings $50 per square meter of 
green roof, with a maximum grant of $100,000, if vegetation covers at least fifty 
percent of the available surface area.”90 Thus, while the By-Law creates a cash-in-
lieu system which enables some buildings to opt-out of the green roof 
requirements, the money is used to fund another City of Toronto initiative which 
incentivizes the adoption of green roofs for all buildings.  The green roofs, 
therefore, are incentivized by a maximum grant of $100 000 for their adoption 
and non-compliance is disincentivized by a maximum penalty of$100 000.  
While technical in its application, the green roof By-Law is also very creative. 
Toronto is “…the first city in North America to adopt a by-law to require and 
govern the construction of green roofs on new development.”91 In addition to 
being innovative, the RAP classifies the green roof By-Law as a form of pollution 
“source control.”92 This classification may not be obvious, but source control 
refers to a preventative technique that focuses on avoiding “…the creation of 
hazardous substances” in the first place, “whether it be waste in an industrial 
process or products that leave toxic residues.”93 Green roofs achieve pollution 
source control  by storing water absorbed by the plant life.94 As a result, during 
periods of heavy rainfall the green roof provides for greater storm water retention 
and prevents “overburdening storm water management facilities.”95 Green roofs 
thus prevent pollution by preventing sewage overflow due to storm water, the 
main pathway pollutants take to the Great Lakes.  
Green roofs are a fascinating example of a pollution prevention mechanism 
that the City of Toronto adopted while aiming to be a “global leader”96 in the 
area. The ability of other municipalities in Canada to participate in pollution 
prevention by way of green roofs is more complicated. The City of Toronto was 
given the specific authority to create By-Laws mandating the construction of 
 
90 Catherine Malina, “Up on the Roof: Implementing Local Government Policies to Promote and Achieve 
the Environmental, Social, and Economic Benefits of Green Roof Technology Note” (2010) 23 Georget 
Int'l Envtl L Rev 437 at 451. 
91 Kidd, supra note 80, at 39. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Paul R Muldoon, Marcia Valiante & Canadian Institute of Resources Law, Toxic water pollution in Canada: 
regulatory principles for reduction and elimination with emphasis on Canadian federal and Ontario law  (Calgary: Canadian 
Institute of Resources Law, 1988) at 68. 
94 Malina, supra note 90 at 439. 
95 Ibid at 441. 
96 Tai Ziola, “The Growth of Green Building Feature: Real Estate Law” (2012) 37 LawNow 15 at 16.  
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green roofs in the CTA.97 Tai Ziola explains, “…the Building Code Act generally 
prohibits municipal By-Laws from exceeding the requirements of the provincial 
building code,” but the authority extended to the City of Toronto by way of the 
CTA largely bypassed this issue, provided that nothing in Toronto’s Green Roof 
By-Law directly conflicts with a Building Code Act provision.98 Other municipalities 
which lack the legislative authority to make By-Laws on green roofs are in a much 
more difficult place and are “…understandably hesitant to make any green 
building standards mandatory for third-party builders.”99  
The implementation of source-control pollution prevention techniques, in 
the realm of green roofs and other eco-building requirements, may be possible in 
municipalities without the specific authority to create green roof by-laws. Ziola 
helpfully indicates other legal avenues that a municipality may take to create 
‘green’ building standards including green roofs. The City of Stratchona in 
Alberta “…[is] experimenting with including green building criteria in the zoning 
requirements for certain sites. This strategy may include a requirement for a 
specific level of environmental performance being embedded in the permitted 
land uses for the property.”100 Another alternative could be the use of 
development agreements. Though Ziola does not use the label of development 
agreements, it is suggested that municipalities, could trade benefits like higher 
density or increased height allowances for ‘green’ building standards when dealing 
with developers.101  
To summarize the discussion of green roofs: The Green Roof by-law in 
Toronto is the first of its kind in North America because it “require[s] the 
installation of green roofs for many forms of new construction,”102 and 
consequently, it provides an example and a goalpost for other municipalities when 
dealing with issues of pollution both in the Great Lakes, and elsewhere, due to 
storm water. From a pollution standpoint, the by-law is preventative in nature, 
because it is a form of source-control. While other municipalities may struggle 
 
97 CTA, supra note 28, s 108(1). 
98 Building Code Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 23.  
99 Ziola, supra note 96, at 17. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid at 18. 
102 James D Brown, “Biophilic Laws: Planning for Cities with Nature” (2016) 34 Va Envtl LJ 52 at 84. 
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with enacting a green roof by-law like the City of Toronto, due to a lack of 
legislative authority, other legal avenues like development agreements may 
provide for similar preventative results.  
Mandatory Downspout Disconnection 
A discussion of green roofs flows naturally into the City of Toronto’s 
Mandatory Downspout Disconnection program because it is another example of 
source control.103 Downspouts carry water from snow or rain from roofs into the 
sewer system by way of a drain pipe in the ground that is connected to the 
downspout. When there is an influx of storm water the sewer system may be 
overloaded, which results in untreated sewage overflow.104 To avoid sewage 
overflow and subsequent lake pollution, downspouts can be disconnected and 
instead a connection can be added to “divert rainwater and snowmelt onto the 
ground.”105 A program of Mandatory Downspout Disconnection thus aims at 
preventing the source of the pollution, the sewage overflow, from ever 
manifesting.  
As stated above, the City of Toronto has been granted the authority to 
regulate sewers and sewer usage by sections 8(1), (2), and (3) of the CTA.106 The 
Mandatory Downspout Disconnection by-laws fall under subsection 681-11S of 
the Sewers chapter in the Code. Subsections 681-11S(3), (4), and (5) respectively 
indicate that no downspout may be connected to a combined storm sewer, a 
storm sewer that is recognized for basement flooding, or a storm sewer in any 
other part of the city.107 
Subsections (3), (4), and (5) have phased enforcement. Chapter 681 was 
amended in 2008 by By-law 1255-2008.108 By-law no. 1255-2008 mandated that 
the by-law obligating the disconnection of any downspouts in areas of the city 
 
103 Kidd, supra note 80, at 39. 




105 Ibid.  
106 CTA, supra note 28. 
107 City of Toronto, supra note 74, §681-11S(3)-(5). 
108 City of Toronto, By-law No 1255-2008, To amend City of Toronto Municipal Code Chapter 681, Sewers (3 
December 2008). 
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with combined sewers was to come into force four years after its original 
enactment in 2007.109 Likewise, the by-law dictating that downspouts must be 
disconnected from storm sewers in parts of the city recognized for basement 
flooding came into force five years after its enactment on December 3rd, 2013; 
the final by-law dictating that all downspouts must be disconnected from storm 
sewers in all other areas of the city came into force on December 3rd, 2016.110 
The phases gave all affected citizens a wealth of time to complete the 
required disconnection by the coming-into-force date. Research done in 2013, 
prior to the second deadline on December 3rd, indicated that there had already 
been 63% compliance with subsection (4) and 60.95% compliance with 
subsection (5).111 By that point, there had been 79% compliance with subsection 
(3) which had already come into force.112 Like with green roofs, there may be 
exemptions to the mandatory disconnection if it is not feasible or is hazardous.113 
Additionally, there are penalties for non-compliance.114 
Nancy Stoner has noted the importance of downspout disconnection, 
especially in conjunction with other ‘green’ building requirements like green 
roofs. She explains that while each disconnection may only divert a small amount 
of storm water, the cumulative effect of each disconnection is significant.115 The 
City of Toronto’s program is relatively new, and thus there is limited data on its 
success. The City of Portland, Oregon implemented a downspout disconnection 
program in 1993 and found that the policy resulted in one billion gallons of storm 
water being diverted away from the combined sewer systems every year, 
preventing overflow.116 Green roofs provide similar source control by way of 
storm water diversion and thus are similar preventative mechanisms to 
downspout disconnection, in addition to the fact they are both examples of 
‘green’ infrastructure. Stoner indicates that the two source-control mechanisms 
 
109 Ibid, s 2.  
110 Ibid, s 3(a)-(b).  
111 Kidd, supra note 80 at 39. Section (4) refers to areas of the city that have been identified as “Basement 
Flooding Study Areas” and section (5) refers to any other area of the city.  
112 Ibid.  
113 City of Toronto, supra note 74, §681-11(S)(6). 
114 Ibid, §681-14.1A(1). 
115 Nancy Stoner, “Green Solutions for Controlling Combined Sewer Overflows” (2006) 21 Nat Resources 
& Env't 7 at 59. 
116 Ibid. 
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work very well together, as they can each handle some of the storm water burden, 
and thus their cumulative effect is greater.117 While this may be true, downspout 
disconnection presents far fewer legal conundrums given that it falls quite 
squarely within a municipality’s authority over sewers. Consequently, downspout 
disconnection provides an example of a pollution prevention mechanism that can 
be adopted by municipalities with even more limited authority.  
The extent of the legal difficulty with downspout disconnection is 
demonstrated in the case of Moghaddham v Moghaddam.118 In Moghaddam, the 
Ontario Municipal Board authorized the Applicant’s requested building code 
variances as the variances pertained only to minimal increases in floor area and 
floor size of the subject property, and as such the variances satisfied all 
requirements.119 Two neighbours of the Applicant were given participant status. 
They expressed concerns that the disconnections were causing flooding in the 
backyards and in the streets of the neighbourhood. Additionally, they expressed 
concern that new homes, like the one the Applicant sought to build, would result 
in “troughs discharging water onto neighbouring properties, contributing to 
ongoing problems.”120 The Board expressed sympathy for these concerns, but 
indicated that it would be dealt with by the grading and drainage plan for the 
property, and did not impact the validity of the variances sought.121  
It appears that while downspout disconnection is in its infancy, the City of 
Toronto may experience some additional drainage issues, which will need to be 
addressed by the drainage plans that are submitted to the City alongside building 
permit applications.122 Downspout disconnection, however, is considered to be a 
valid means of preventing storm water runoff and sewage overflow, and it is a 
further demonstration of the municipality’s preventative capacity to address 
pollution control, particularly in the Great Lakes region.  
Pollution Prevention Plans 
 
117 Ibid. 
118 2015 CarswellOnt 7583 (Ont Mun B) [Moghaddam]. 
119 Ibid at para 11.  
120 Ibid at para 9.  
121 Ibid at para 10.  
122 City of Toronto, “Grading and Drainage Procedure Requirements,” (website) online: 
<https://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=1bd90680bd550410VgnVCM10000071d60
f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=3c82707b1a280410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD>. 
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The preventative capacity of a municipality may be most obvious when 
examining the City of Toronto’s Sewers By-law mandating the adoption of 
Pollution Prevention Plans by businesses in Toronto. ‘Pollution Prevention’ as a 
concept is defined as, “…[t]he use of processes, practices, materials, products or 
energy that avoid or minimize the creation of pollutants and wastes, at the 
source.”123 Pollution Prevention Plans may be considered a form of source-
control as well.  
The by-law dictating the adoption of Pollution Prevention Plans is 
comprehensive. The by-law requires that Subject Section Industries or industries 
which discharge subject pollutants are required to submit a Pollution Prevention 
Plan within a year of commencing operations.124 An updated plan must be 
submitted every six years unless the subject industry adopts the Best Management 
Practices which are approved by the Council of the City of Toronto.125 
Section 681-5C(2) in Chapter 681 lists the required contents of a Pollution 
Prevention Plan. Briefly, it should list the processes used by the industry which 
produce the pollutants, the pollutants themselves, a description of pollution 
prevention techniques related to sewer discharge, and three- and six- year targets 
for the elimination of subject pollutants.126 The table of subject pollutants is listed 
in section 681-5L and it is updated periodically with new pollutants. For instance, 
in 2014 hexavalent chromium was added to the list of subject chemicals.127 By-
law number 100-2016 enacted on February 4th, 2016 replaced the subject 
pollutant table in Chapter 681 with a new, updated table.128 
The Pollution Prevention Plans have already been recognized for their 
success. The most recent progress report on the successful implementation of the 
RAP has indicated that, since the implementation of Pollution Prevention Plans 
at subject businesses, there has been a reduction in the amount of mercury and 
 
123 City of Toronto, supra note 74, § 681-1.  
124 Ibid, § 681-5A. Subject Section Industries are defined in § 681-1 as “[a]ny industry which carries out an 
activity listed in Appendix 1 to this article.” 
125 Ibid, § 681-5B(1). 
126 Ibid, § 681-5C(2)(a)-(h).  
127 Kidd, supra note 80, at 43.  
128 City of Toronto, supra note 74, s 1(BB). 
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nonylphenol ethoxylates (NPE) found in the influent at wastewater treatment 
plants.129 Further, environmental performance in all sectors has improved.130  
This is a preventative technique which differs from green roofs and 
downspout disconnection markedly. While the other preventative mechanisms 
examined were infrastructure-oriented, this is a method of source-control based 
on the management practices of the polluting industries themselves. By limiting 
the amount of pollutant that could be discharged into sewers, the problem of 
sewage overflow is also minimized, because sewage overflow becomes less 
harmful due to its contents. This is perhaps the most preventative of the 
municipal mechanisms examined thus far since it targets one of the most 
preliminary stages of the ‘pollution pipeline.’  
In 1999, when the City of Toronto proposed a sewers by-law which 
mandated Pollution Prevention Plans, it was “…expected to set the precedent for 
other major cities in Canada.”131 Similar to the Green Roofs By-law, the City of 
Toronto was the first municipality in Canada “…to implement a Pollution 
Prevention reporting program under a Sewers By-law.”132 It is an excellent 
example of municipal engagement in pollution prevention. Interestingly, in 1999, 
the federal government passed a new Environmental Protection Act with a preamble 
that specified pollution prevention as an environmental priority in Canada.133 In 
a serendipitous turn of events, the federal government made pollution prevention 
a priority and the City of Toronto proposed its own sewers by-law replete with 
prevention techniques. This is perhaps evidence of a municipality’s preventative 
edge; its ability to quickly direct local initiatives makes it an excellent site for 
pollution prevention.   
Outfall Monitoring 
The above initiatives are some of the City of Toronto’s most successful and 
most notable pollution prevention projects. Where there is non-compliance with 
 
129 Kidd, supra note 80 at 43. 
130 Ibid.  
131 Dean Saul, “Canadian Legal Developments Foreign Law Year in Review: 1999” (2000) 34 Int Lawyer 
ABA 849 at 853. 
132 General Manager of Toronto Water, Sewers and Water Supply By-laws 2015 Compliance and 
Enforcement Annual Report (Toronto: City of Toronto 2016) at 4. 
133 Canadian Environmental Protection Act, SC 1999, c 33; Saul, supra note 131 at 852. 
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the by-laws, however, the Toronto municipality also requires enforcement 
programs. The Outfall Monitoring Program is particularly relevant in this respect.  
Outfalls refer to the “…exit points of the city storm sewers into the 
waterways.”134 The Outfall Monitoring Program inspectors examine the discharge 
from the outfalls and monitor those outfalls that frequently discharge polluted 
water with the intent of eliminating the problem.135 The contamination may be 
caused by illegal cross-connections where wastewater is inappropriately 
discharged into storm sewers. In the early 2000s in Boston, cross-connections 
were responsible for 70, 000 gallons of untreated sewage being drained into the 
Charles River from storm sewers every day.136 In Toronto, the Outfall Monitoring 
Program seeks to find and correct any and all cross-connections to eliminate 
polluted outfalls. The program began in 2005.137 
The Outfall Monitoring Program is performed by the Environmental 
Monitoring & Protection Unit comprised of officers authorized under the 
Provincial Offences Act and the CTA.138 Members of the Environmental Monitoring 
& Protection Unit serve Toronto Water, the City of Toronto’s water division. 
They are also “…responsible for administrative compliance and enforcement of 
the City of Toronto's Sewers and Water Supply by-laws.”139  
From the data collected by the Environmental Monitoring and Protection 
Unit, the General Manager of Toronto Water submits an annual report to the 
Public Works and Infrastructure Committee, indicating the number of illegal 
cross-connections discovered and the number of convictions under the Sewers 
and Water Supply by-laws.140  In 2016 there were 26 convictions under the Sewers 
By-law resulting in $365 250 in fines. One conviction under the Water Supply by-
 
134 City of Toronto, “Outfall Monitoring Program” (website) online: 
<https://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=fe545c546218f310VgnVCM10000071d60f
89RCRD&vgnextchannel=fe4cfe4eda8ae310VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD>. 
135 Ibid.  
136 Stacy D Harrop, “Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems: Is Compliance with State Water Quality 
Standards Only a Pipe Dream?” (2001) 31:3 Environ Law 767 at 800. 
137 Ibid.  
138 Provincial Offences Act, RSO 1990, c P 33; CTA, supra note 28, s 91(1).  
139 General Manager of Toronto Water, Sewers and Water Supply By-laws 2016 Compliance and 
Enforcement Annual Report (Toronto: City of Toronto, 2017) at 1.  
140 Toronto, City Council Decision, Wet Weather Flow Master Plan and Basement Flooding Protection 
Program Update, PW7.6, (21 September 2011) at para 14. 
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law resulted in a fine of $7500.141 There were 41 cross-connections identified in 
the sewers where “…sanitary wastewater [was] misdirected to a storm sewer.”142 
48 cross-connections were also fixed, and eight outfalls were delisted because the 
water discharged was of acceptable quality.143 Since the program began in 2005, 
710 cross-connections were corrected resulting in 138 outfalls being delisted.144 
It is clear that the Outfall Monitoring Program falls under the pollution methods 
of abatement and mitigation, rather than prevention. It is an end-of-pipe solution 
rather than source-control. The problem of outfall discharge is mitigated by 
enforcing the by-laws and cutting off illegal cross-sections in the sewers. Pollution 
is consequently abated in some receiving waters, including Lake Ontario, where 
the outfalls have been delisted.  
Preventative, source-control by-laws appear to be the most effective 
mechanisms used by the City of Toronto to address pollution, but the use of by-
laws consequently requires enforcement should those by-laws be ignored. It is 
both reasonable and desirable that a strong enforcement mechanism, like the 
Outfall Monitoring Program, pairs with pollution prevention by-laws.  
CONCLUSION 
In the Ontario Court of Appeal case, Scarborough (Borough) v REF Homes Ltd 
Justice Lacourcière characterized the municipality as “a trustee for the 
environment.”145 This characterization, without further explanation as to the 
trustee’s duties or obligations, is meaningless. While this paper does not advance 
a theory of the municipality as a trustee, this paper does attempt to elucidate the 
extent of a municipality’s environmental authority, or more colloquially, how a 
municipality may care for the environment. It does not do so by studying how a 
municipality’s authority may be expanded. Rather, this paper examines 
environmental powers that fall within the established scope of municipal 
authority. By performing a case study of the City of Toronto’s successful efforts 
 
141 General Manager Toronto Water, supra note 139 at 1.  
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in the realm of Great Lake pollution management, it is clear that a municipality is 
well-suited to pollution prevention. Not only does the City of Toronto example 
showcase preventative techniques that may be adopted by other municipalities 
when dealing with Great Lake pollution, it additionally provides a keen picture of 
the municipality as a pollution preventer.  
The lessons from the first part of this paper, that a municipality’s authority 
is confined to the areas legislated by the province, remain true. But, the second 
part of this paper provides guidance as to how the municipality may properly 
harness the environmental authority that is extended to it: by way of source 
control.  
The answer to the “decades-old question” of the “actual extent of municipal 
jurisdiction over environmental matters”146 may be prevention. Beyond 
prevention, the ramifications of pollution and many other environmental issues 




146 Epstein, supra note 2 at 57. 
